Touro Law Review
Volume 16

Number 4

Article 6

March 2016

Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law
Beverly Horsburgh
Andrew Cappel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons,
Commercial Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Dispute
Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Legal Writing
and Research Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Horsburgh, Beverly and Cappel, Andrew (2016) "Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law," Touro
Law Review: Vol. 16: No. 4, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/6

This Common Sense and Contracts Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Horsburgh and Cappel: Cognition and Common Sense

COGNITION AND COMMON SENSE IN
CONTRACT LAW
2
Beverly Horsburghl and Andrew Cappel

INTRODUCTION
In this article, we explore certain aspects of the complex
relationship between common sense and formal legal rules of
contractual obligation.
There is already well established
literature, primarily influenced by economic and game theoretic
approaches, that has looked at the interaction of formal law with

putatively "commonsense" social norms. 3 In contrast, we adopt
a different approach; one that draws upon the findings of
cognitive scientists who investigate the effects of the interaction
between internal mental operations and external cultural factors
on human thought, reasoning skills and the acquisition of

knowledge.

Our discussion focuses on the Seventh Circuit's

decision in Hill v. Gateway4
Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., Univ. of
Miami School of Law, B.A., Smith College.
2 Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D.,
Yale Law School, M. Phil Yale University, B.A., Yale College.
3 This literature is voluminous. For an overview, see, e.g., ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms:
Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOCIETY REv. 157
(2000). On contractual norms, see, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Searchfor lImnanent Business Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
4 In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), a group of
consumers filed a class action lawsuit based on the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against a computer manufacturer, alleging
mail and wire fraud. On appeal, Judge Easterbrook found that the contract
was formed when the buyers received the computer, had the opportunity to
read a document setting forth the terms of the sale and failed to return the
merchandise within the prescribed thirty day period. Id. at 1150. Insisting
that it made no "sense" to distinguish the case from a previous decision
involving the licensing of software (ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996)), Judge Easterbrook held that the consumers agreed to be
bound by the seller's terms, including a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate
all disputes. Gateway, supra at 1148-49. The Judge also reasoned that as a
practical matter, it is a waste of time for telephone operators to inform
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Originally Gateway's Document of Standard Terms and
Conditions stated that the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce governed arbitration. 5
The consumers argued that the forum was unusual and that
inasmuch as I.C.C. headquarters were in France, it was difficult
to even locate the organization in order to look at its rules. 6 The
cost of arbitration was also prohibitive. A claim for less than
$50,000 required an advance fee of $4,000, and included a $2000
nonrefundable registration fee.7 Furthermore, the travel costs
were disproportionate to the amount of damages sought ($1000
per customer). The consumers also assumed the risk of paying
Gateway's legal costs if they did not prevail in the arbitration
hearing. 8 Even though the court found the arbitration agreement
unconscionable because excessive costs prevented the buyers
from using the forum and thus, they were deprived of any form
of redress, the case was remanded to the Supreme Court for the
parties to choose a suitable arbiter. Gateway had previously
agreed to arbitrate before the American Arbitration Association, 9
where the court upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause
in a standard form contract in the context of the sale of
computers to customers over the telephone.
Our study reflects four insights that have arisen in the
course of cognitive scientists' investigation of the workings of the
human mind. First, much of what we understand as "common
sense" is not formless and ad hoc, but rather, a highly structured
method through which the mind processes and organizes certain
types of lived experience, and which is deeply rooted in factors
such as cognitive efficiency, the impact of our physical bodies on
the processes of human reasoning, and the repetitive nature of
many of our daily interactions with the physical and social
potential buyers of the terms that apply to mass marketing direct sales
contracts. The interests of customers are better served when a simple 30 day
approve-or-return clause is used, giving buyers the option of either accepting
the terms or shipping the merchandise back to the seller. Id. at 1149.
65 See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569, 570 (1998).
Id. at 571.
7
8

id.
id.

9Id. at 574-75.
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world. 0 Second, much of human thought is organized in terms
of mental representations ("schemas," "cultural models," and
"scenarios") which we use to understand and act upon things and
events in the external world. Third, it is very likely that human
beings do not process all information in the same fashion, but
employ at least two distinct cognitive "styles."
One is a
syntactically organized, linear processing style termed
"seriosymbolic," which is best exemplified by formal logic and
probability theory. The other cognitive style, "connectionist," is
associative, often imagistic, and organized in a parallel network
system; it is best exemplified by the prevalence of metaphor (and
other tropes) in human thought. Specifically, what we term
"common sense" is the interaction of schematic concepts with
connectionist mental architecture, which produces a type of
thinking that is markedly different from rule governed, often
highly deliberative seriosymbolic thought.
Finally, certain findings from cognitive science strongly
suggest that some of our basic moral intuitions may be related to
specific features of the interaction between our cognitive faculties
and the external physical/social world." Moral concepts can
thus be seen to have a determinate structure, rooted in the
cognitive nature of human beings: the ways we conceive of and
encounter the world. Ethical standards arise out of the reality of
human experience, and accordingly can be understood without
recourse to intuitionism, efficiency analysis, or deontological
mysticism. In this article, we are chiefly concerned with
contractual unfairness, specifically our cognitive awareness of
what constitutes unfair surprise.
We begin this article with an overview of the ways in
which we use schemas, cultural models, and scenarios to
organize our comprehension of the world, and how these forms
of mental representation characteristically interact with
seriosymbolic and connnectionist processing systems.
In the
next section, we apply these insights to the particular reasoning
10 See generally SconT ATRAN, COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL
HISTORY: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1996).
" See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH
415-39 (1999); MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION (1993).
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processes involved in commercial transactions. Specifically we
show that while the seller's behavior in a transaction often
reflects the seriosymbolic cognitive style of a rational maximizer,
consumers use a very different schematic/connectionist model to
organize their understanding of the same transaction. This model
is derived from our repetitive experiences in daily living, so
much so that it is difficult, and in some contexts probably
impossible, for consumers to change to an alternative reasoning.
We reserve our descriptive and normative analysis of Hill
v. Gateway for the concluding section. Here we principally
claim that: (i) the court erred by failing to take into account the
different cognitive methods of the seller and consumers, and

thereby unjustifiably privileged one style (seriosymbolic) at the
expense of another widespread, equally valid, form of reasoning;
(ii) the cognitive disparity between sellers and consumers in this
type of transaction suggests that because consumers tend to rely
on a different form of reasoning than sellers in purchasing the
items used in daily living, there is a need for legal intervention,
including minimally, but not exclusively, a robust notice
requirement in standard form contracts that contain unusual
provisions such as arbitration clauses 12 ; and, (iii) failure to
We recognize that at the present time the state's ability to regulate
arbitration terms in contracts between buyers and sellers could well be limited
in light of Supreme Court rulings that have greatly expanded the preemptive
force of the Federal Arbitration Act over 'state law. See Allied-Bruce
Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984). Particularly relevant in this context is the
Court's holding that a state law requiring prominent notice in order for an
arbitration clause to be enforceable was preempted by the F.A.A. See
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656-57 (1996).
Other scholars (see, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward A State
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 577
(1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking The Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration:A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers and Due Process Concerns, 72 TULANE L. REv. 1
(1997)) have addressed the ramifications of these decisions. Our purpose in
this essay is simply to shed some light on problems of a cognitive nature that
ensue from imposing arbitration on unsuspecting parties. Obviously, our
suggestions on regulating arbitration terms in contracts with consumers should
be construed as theoretical, although we believe that our approach is far more
sensible and realistic than the Court's approach.
12
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account for this type of cognitive disparity, by enforcing an
arbitration clause in a standard form consumer contract, is one
important way we define, on an intuitive level, the meaning of
contractual unfairness.
We conclude by suggesting that the court's efficiency
analysis in Hill v. Gateway in and of itself may well be flawed,
inasmuch as it does not consider the potential harm that can occur
when the essential basis of trust that is necessary for the
workings of a commercial society is compromised by sanctioning
behavior which is viewed widely, and on a deep cognitive level,
as fundamentally unfair.
PART ONE
Schemas, CulturalModels, and Scenarios

Cognitive scientists have long understood that the
categories through which our minds organize and interpret inputs
from the physical and social world often do not operate according
to rules of formal logic, i.e. the definition of a set of necessary
and sufficient rules for category membership.' 3 Rather, when it
comes to implicit learning and pattern recognition tasks, human
beings tend to rely on more informal and flexible units of
knowledge termed schemas. 14
Functioning as automatic
processing and knowledge structuring systems, schemas allow us
to divide the world into categories so that objects, events, and
environmental interactions are instantaneously distinguished and
absorbed. 15 Schemas are highly abstract mental representations
that organize a relationship amongst a number of component
13 See JOHN H. HOLLAND, KEITH J. HOLYOAK, RICHARD E. NEsBIT & PAUL
R. THAGARD, INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING, AND

DISCOVERY 182 (1986).
For a recent view concerning the relationship
between cognitive/cultural categories and law, see generally ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROmE BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 19-109 (2000).
14 See RoY D'ANDRADE, THE DEELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
136, 138-140, 143-45, 178 (1995); CLAUDIA STRAUSS & NAOMI QUINN, A
COGNITiVE THEORY OF CULTURAL MEANING 53, 58 (1997).
15 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 142, 144-45; Paul DiMaggio, Culture
and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 269 (1997).
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elements, either images or propositions.' 6 For example, the
schema of "writing" organizes relations among the writer, the
thing written upon, and the writing instrument, etc.1 7 Typically,
many of the elements contained in a schema are not precisely
defined in the schema itself, but rather function as variables (or
open "slots") which allow the schema to function in multiple
contexts.18 These slots are filled in with more concrete detail
according to the specific context in which the schema is applied.
If contextual information is ambiguous or simply not present,
normative expectations ("default values") about "what goes with
what" fill in the empty slots. 19

Simpler schemas are often embedded in a hierarchical
structure as components of more complex schemas.* ° This
process allows us to "chunk" together large amounts of
information into a small number of cognitive structures. Such a
"chunking" device is believed to be our mind's response to the
limitations on short-term memory, since we can simultaneously
retain only a small number of the inputs that are received from
sensory perception or from our long-term memory reservoir.'
Nearly all that we know about the world is mediated by
schematic networks, which on an unconscious level partly select
what is observed, determine the ways phenomena are perceived,

16

See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 132, 179; Naomi Quinn & Dorothy

Holland, Culture and Cognition, in CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND

THOUGHT 24-27 (eds. Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn, 1987) (discussing
proposition and image schemas) [hereinafter CULTURAL MODELS]; PAUL R.
THAGARD, MIND: INTRODUCTION To COGNITIVE SCIENCE 93-105 (1996)
(referring to images in human thought).
17 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 123.
18 See THAGARD, supra note 16, at 61-61, 66.

For example, the writing

schema does not specify any particular type of writing instrument, which can
be, for example, a pen, pencil, or even an airplane (in the case of
"skywriting"). D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 123-24.
19 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 124; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14,
at 41; HOLLAND et al., supra note 13, at 182-83.
20 For example, the writing schema includes sub-schemas for writing
instruments, languages, etc. D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 121.
21 See id. at 44-45.
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and classify the information that has been conveyed so that the
data is easily available for use in daily living.2
One particularly important group of schemas is grounded
in our kinesthetic awareness of our own bodies. According to
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, such awareness in early
childhood initiates the formation of spatial bodily image schemas
that lend themselves to the creation of metaphors and other kinds
of symbolization.23
Given that bodily experiences recur
constantly, every day of our lives, schemata intimately related to
the body are inherently meaningful constructs by which we make
sense of our non-bodily experiences, communicate with others
and they impart a general form to what we observe through our
senses and think in our minds.24
Through metaphorical
projections, we map the structure of these spatial schemas (the
concrete source domain) onto objects, events and concepts (the
abstract target domain).25 What makes the connection between
the source and the target so powerful is that the metaphor is
motivated by the degree to which it correlates with everyday life,
particularly insofar as these experiences are rooted in everyday
perceptual imagery such as vision and hearing.26 For example,
early childhood experiences in learning how to crawl 27 lead to the
creation of the source-path-goal schema, a primary bodily image
structure that involves movement from one location along a path
until the final destination of the journey is reached.28
2 See id. at 120-22, 136, 179; DAvID

I. KERTZER, RITUAL, POLITICS, AND

POWER 79 (1988); MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY
BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON 18 (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABoUr
THE MIND 6 (1987).

23 See generally JOHNSON, supra note 22; LAKOFF, supra note 22; GEORGE
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
24 See LAKOFF, supra note 22, at 267-68. For a groundbreaking article
applying Lakoff and Johnson's metaphor theory to legal analysis, see Steven
L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1107 (1989).
25 See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 112-13; GARY PALMER, TOWARD A

THEORY OF CULTURAL LINGUISTICS 103 (1996).
26 See LAKOFF, supra note 22, at 277-78.
27 See id. at 277; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 115.
2 See LAKOFF, supranote 22, at 275; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 113.
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As noted before, schematic reasoning applies not only to
classifying objects, but also events.
Consequently, many
schemas include an implicit narrative component. Arguably
there is at least an inchoate narrative structure to even the
simplest schematic unit that contains a causal relationship
amongst its constituent element.2 9 This is certainly true for
higher level schemas that represent events in the physical and
social worlds. Researchers in artificial intelligence have long
noted that due to limits on human cognitive capacity, it is
difficult to model human intelligence without recourse to scripts,
units of thought within the mind that organize our comprehension
of the recurring- events of everyday life into standardized
sequences of events. 30
Another source for the ubiquity of narrative in our
frequently used schematic structures probably relates to our
sensory experiences of space and time. Lakoff has noted how the
source-path-goal schema gives rise to a script that denotes a
passage through time, entailing an initial state, a sequence of
events and a final state. 3' Throughout life, we have unfulfilled
desires and so we envision ourselves as moving in directions that
enable us to obtain our objectives. 32 If we need apples, we think
in terms of leaving our homes, walking or riding to the grocery
store, selecting some apples and paying the seller. There is a
basic logic to the choice of spatial metaphor:33 purposes or goals
29

See generally PAUL

RICOEUR,

NARRATIVE, AND IMAGINATION

FIGURING

THE

SACRED:

RELIGION,

(1995) (kernel of narrative found in any

causal relationship of two objects).
30 For the fons et origo of script theory in artificial intelligence, see generally
ROGER SCHANK
UNDERSTANDING

& ROBERT ABELSON,

SCRIPTS,

PLANS,

GOALS,

AND

(1977). A well known example given by Schank and
Abelson is the "restaurant script," which outlines the prototypical framework
of events involved in dining out, for example, being seated, ordering food,
paying, etc. For a-discussion of such narrative scripts, see Robert A. Randall,
Steps Towards an Ethnosemantics of Verbs: Complex Fishing Technique
Scripts and the "Unsaid" in Listener Identification, in DIRECTIONS IN

249, 252-53 (ed. Janet W.D. Dougherty, 1985);
Quinn & Holland, supra note 16, at 19-22.
31See LAKOFF, supra note 22, at 285-86.
32 See id. at 278; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 114.
33 See LAKoFF, supra note 22, at 278.
COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGY,
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in life are understood
in terms of traveling from a starting point
34

to an endpoint.

Along with

scripts,

cognitive

anthropologists

have

identified yet another particularly important type of mental
representation that they term a cultural model. Cultural models
are the presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that
we employ in order to make sense out of a chaotic universe
containing a bewildering multitude of physical and social
phenomena. These models generate and reinforce the social
meanings given to various objects and events as well as

incorporate the ideologies, values, informal norms and rituals of
behavior that distinguish a culture and render it unique.3" While
some models can incorporate aspects of scientific knowledge or
knowledge that is exclusive to a specific profession, many are the
repositories of our folk knowledge, our implicit understandings
of the way the world works which oftentimes need not be made
explicit in our dealings with others. 36 A good many of these folk
cultural models are widely shared by millions of people who are
raised in the same society and are exposed, in some form or
other, to the same cultural products (although there are, of
course, other alternative models in many subcultures)." Indeed,
culture could not exist without these reality-defining models
inasmuch as they frame our understandings of the world.3 s
Because cultural models are widely shared within a specific
id. at 275; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 115-117.
See Quinn & Holland, supra note 16, at 3-4, 11, 22; PALIER, supra note
25, at 56, 61-62; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 49,140. These
structures of implicit knowledge are a part of what Jack Balkin terms our
"cultural software" or "cultural know-how," the traditions, ideas and beliefs
that are important to a society and handed down from generation to
generation. See J.M. BALKIN, A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 57, 242 (1998).
36 For an in depth discussion of folk knowledge and folk biology (historical
and self-evident beliefs about nature that comport with phenomenological
realism and intuition), see ATRAN, supra note 10, at 1-2, 67.
37 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 122-23.
38 See id. at 154 (stating that models possess "referential transparency" and
"See

35

become "what one sees with, but seldom what one sees"). See also Quinn &

Holland, supra note 16, at 3, 21-22. The authors explain that models contain
what [people] "must know in order to act as they do, make the things they
make and interpret their experience in the distinctive way they do." Id. at 4.
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society, they stabilize the meanings of a multitude of activities,
thereby making it possible for individuals to understand each
other, at least on some levels of experience.3
Cultural models are composed out of underlying
schematic structures, either a single schema or numerous
schematic clusters that combine to form intricate pyramids of
thought. 40 In keeping with schemas in general, all-purpose
cultural models of wide applicability reduce the total amount of
knowledge that must be accumulated for us to function in society,
and thus are highly cognitively efficient devices. 41 Also like
schemas in general, more basic cultural models often are
component elements of other commonly shared models in
multiple domains of experience. 42 Cultural models are also
similar to scripts, inasmuch as they typically involve a narrative
component that is usually termed a scenario.
Cultural models and their associated scenarios also differ
in certain ways from the schemas and scripts from which they are
composed. Scenarios are not the same as the scripts described in
artificial intelligence research, in that their narrative structure is
not limited to recurring events that we personally experience in
43
everyday life, but also includes culturally acquired knowledge.
More fundamental is the distinction between cultural models as
mental representations and their underlying schemas. As noted
before, viewed strictly from the internal perspective of the mind,
schemas are typically highly abstract and generally contain many
open slots, thereby making them applicable to many different
types of situations. When schemas and scenarios are instantiated
as cultural models, reflecting widely shared background cultural
knowledge, however, they develop prototype effects. Many of
39 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at

6-8, 54, 59, 122-23. The authors
argue that shared meanings exist to the extent there are domains of common
experience. See id. at 54, 83-84.
40 See D'ANDRADE supra note 14,at 151-52, 180. The concept of a cognitive
model is further developed in Roy D'Andrade, A Folk Model of the Mind, in
CULTURAL MODELS, supra note 16, at 112-13.
41 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 34.

For a discussion on the ways that the elements of various basic models
interact with each other, see HOLLAND & QUINN, supra note 16, at 34-35.
43 See id. at 22.
42
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the open slots are filled in with widely shared cultural
assumptions so as to form stock models of behavior. 44 As two
prominent researchers put it, prototypical cultural models
"invoke whole worlds in which things work, actors perform, and
events unfold in a simplified and wholly expectable manner...
chained together by shared assumptions about causality." 45
Accordingly, the loss in flexibility from purely schematic
reasoning is compensated by an increase in intersubjective
understandings and ease of communication. 6 Furthermore,
whereas schemas only exist within the mind, cultural models are
widely shared and exist to some extent in the social world itself.
The fact that higher level schemas/cultural models are
used to reason and plan our actions over a wide range of
everyday activities has two further implications. First, many
higher level schemas and cultural models are employed
pragmatically, in connection with concrete reasoning situations.
The cognitive strategy concerning which schema/model to apply
to a specific decision-making task, as well as the general strategy
to employ schematic thinking, in place of more formal reasoning
processes like decision theory or mathematical probability, is
highly context dependent. We use the schema or model that is
most appropriate for the specific problem to be solved, rather
than the model or method of reasoning that is most useful in the
abstract.47 Indeed, experiments suggest that it is difficult, and
44

Schematic categories also exhibit a form of prototype effect. See Brian H.

Ross & Valerie S. Makin, Prototype versus Exemplar Models in Cognition, in
THE NATURE OF COGNITION 205 (ed. Robert J. Steinberg, 1999) [hereinafter
NATURE OF COGNrrION].

This effect is much stronger, however, in the case

of cultural models. See, e.g., D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 124.
45 Quinn & Holland, supra note 16, at 20.
46 For example, a commonly shared model of marriage allows Americans to
meaningfully describe and discuss marriage with one another while retaining
sufficient flexibility so as to encompass many different life styles and
marriages. See STRAUss & QUINN, supra note 14, at 193-209. On the other
hand, due to the prototype effect, in much of our culture a concept like gay
marriage would very likely be viewed as outside the category of marriage.
47 For example, while a lay speaker is likely at first instance to categorize a
piece of furniture as a "chair," which is a basic level generic of chairs in
general, an expert carpenter may intuitively apply specific subcategories: desk
chair, kitchen chair, etc. Such pragmatic use of mental categories and
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sometimes impossible, to train people to use methods of greater
general accuracy if folk "pragmatic reasoning schemas" are
effective in the concrete types of reasoning situation that the
individual is likely to encounter a8 Second, because reasoning is
pragmatically context dependent, the social frame in which an
event takes place or a problem arises can have a great influence
over the type of reasoning employed.4 9 The social framing of
action and discourse is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and
one that has a correspondingly widespread impact on human
thought.50
Both schemas and culture models vary in the degree to
which they can change or adapt to new circumstances. Certain
primary level bodily schemas, such as those which organize our
sense perceptions, are predominantly unconscious, determinate in

structure (few open "slots"), and not susceptible to change. 5' In
contrast, complex, higher level schemas vary considerably in
their degree of plasticity and openness to change: some are
flexible and easy to modify, reflecting the human need to cope
with environmental irregularities and unexpected changes in
physical or social phenomena; others are relatively rigid and

difficult to change. 52
particular

must

Cultural models, as social artifacts, in

maintain

a delicate

equilibrium

between

reasoning techniques has been extensively studied by researchers of "situated
cognition." See, e.g., Jean Lave, The Savagery of the Domestic Mind, in
NAKED SCIENCE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO BOUNDARIES, POWER,
AND KNOWLEDGE 87 (ed. Laura Nader 1996) (pragmatic mathematical

reasoning techniques applied to common situations in everyday life); see
generally EDWARD HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD (1994).
48 See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 13, at 183 (reviewing experimental
evidence).
49 Social framing can effect even reasoning based upon formal logic. Thus
semanticist Charles Fillmore offered a now classic example: "bachelor" and
"unmarried man" are logically tautologous, but do we really think of the Pope
as
a bachelor? See LAKOFF, supra note 22, at 70 (quoting Fillmore).
50
See generally, ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974).
51On the rigid and automatic nature of sensory perception, see, e.g., Dennis
R. Profitt, Inferential versus EcologicalApproaches to Perception, in NATURE
OF COGNITION, supra note 44, at 447.
52 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 52-53, 90; D'ANDRADE, supra
note 14, at 142-43.
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adaptability and rigidity. On the one hand, these models must be
sufficiently rigid (and therefore have sufficiently determinate
meaning), so that the concepts which these models embody can
be inter-subjectively comprehensible. As a result, these models
tend to resist alteration despite exposure to new information. 3
At the same time, these models must also possess sufficient
elasticity so as to allow human beings to solve problems, achieve
goals and adapt to a number of situations. 5 4 The relative
adaptability and flexibility of higher level schemas and cultural
models, and the ways in which schemas and models become
rigidified or malleable, is in great part governed by which type of
mental processing the mind employs in a particular problem
solving context.

Cognitive ProcessingSystems
Until this point, we have discussed cognitive schemas,
models, and scenarios primarily in terms of categories through
which we comprehend objects and events. Implicit in this
discussion, however, is the fact that these units are also cognitive
processors: dynamic systems that actively organize and structure
our experiences in specific ways.5 5 This naturally has given rise
to inquiries into how such processing in fact occurs. Cognitivists
have proposed two distinct types of mental architecture that may
govern the thought process. The first is that reasoning operates
by means of seriosymbolic processing, a deliberate, rule-based
method of thinking and reasoning in which information is coded
into abstract symbols that are manipulated sequentially, or in a
chain of steps, according to the formal conventions of logic and
grammatical syntax.5 6 Reasoning is thereby conceived of as the
53 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 178; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note
14, at 54.
r4 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 151; Quinn & Holland, supra note 16,
at 6-7.
55 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 136.

56 See id., at 137; William Bechtel, The Case for Connectionism, in MIND
AND COGNmON: AN ANTHOLOGY 153, 156-58, 164 (William G. Lycan ed.,

1999) [hereinafter MIND AND COGNrION]; Patricia Smith Churchland &

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 4 [2000], Art. 6

1104

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 16

purely formal manipulation of abstract symbols representing
concepts according to a series of logical inferences and rulegoverned arrangements. 57 Seriosymbolic processing can apply at
a number of cognitive levels. At the schematic level, the
relationship between elements contained within a single schema
may operate by means of formal rules, such as if-then

propositions.

8

On a higher level, categories may be combined

and manipulated unconsciously according to the syntactical rules
of a "language of thought," 59 or, on the conscious level,

according to formal systems of logic and probability.

A key

advantage of seriosymbolic processing is that it is cognitively
powerful, inasmuch as it can apply to problems in a wide variety
of situations. 60
Such a rule-bound cognitive system (well-suited to the
rational actor model of human behavior), however, has been
found to apply to only some forms of reasoning and has proven
to be an inadequate description of all our mental operations. This

approach does not adequately recognize the interplay between
reasoning, the culture in which we are situated and our

encounters with physical and social phenomena.61
More
fundamentally, seriosymbolic processing cannot adequately
account for a number of well documented features that we know
are part of the intrinsic structure of human cognition.
Terrence J. Sejnowski, Neurophilosophy and Connectionism, in MIND AND
COGNITION, supra at 133, 138; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 51.
57 For similar observations, see Churchland & Sejnowski, supra note 56, at
138; JOHNSON, supra note 22, at xxxiv; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at
51.
58 See HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 13, at 92-93 (arguing that categories are
composed of "rule clusters"); THAGARD, supra note 16, at 62.
59 On language of thought theory, see generally JERRY A. FODOR, THE
LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT (1975). The most influential theory of this type is
Chomsky's theoryof a rule-based "deep structure" governing syntax. For a
recent defense of this theory, see STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT:
How THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE (1994).
60 See THAGARD, supra note 16, at 42-57.
61 An analysis of the gap between this type of reasoning and culture in
anthropological studies can be found in D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 24647. Johnson also emphasizes the embodied and culturally embedded nature of
our understandings of reality. See JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 100.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/6

14

Horsburgh and Cappel: Cognition and Common Sense

2000

COGN1TION
0
AND COMMON SENSE

1105

Seriosymbolic processing is, relatively speaking, slow, and
therefore inappropriate for certain types of human cognitive
activity, including implicit learning, retrieval of information from
memory, and pattern recognition. 62 These tasks take place with
enormous speed. Additionally, computer modeling reveals that
seriosymbolic systems are inherently brittle; if the input is altered
or the task changed slightly, they tend to "crash." This contrasts
with the human cognitive feature of "graceful degradation,"
whereby we are able to continue processing information even
where some inputs are unclear or missing, and in the face of
changes in context or task assignment. 63
Additionally,
seriosymbolic models cannot adequately explain the human
ability to learn. Generally, computer simulations reveal that
seriosymbolic systems can be trained to "learn" new facts by a
reiterated trial and error based inference process, but only if they
are preprogrammed with substantial background knowledge upon
which the rules can operate.6 For example, a seriosymbolic
system can be trained to learn the rule "Address your elders by
their last name" only if it already knows the meanings of
"elders," "last name," etc. 65 It is precisely this type of
background knowledge, however, that tends to be learned
implicitly, without recourse to trial and error.
In response to these difficulties, a number of cognitive
scientists have proposed an alternate type of processing system
within the mind,, termed "connectionist." In a connectionist
model, mental processing is organized in a network of linked
processing units, which - when activated - "fire" in a manner

analogous to neurons in the human brain.66 In most cases, these
"neurons" function simply by receiving excitatory or inhibitory
See, e.g., D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 144; ICHAEL R.W. DAWSON,
UNDERSTANDING COGnIVE SCIENCE 37 (1998).
6 See, e.g., STRAUSS & QuINN, supra note 14, at 66; DAWSON, supra note
62, at 37-38.
6 STRAuss & QUINN, supra note 14, at 73-74. Recall that it was this problem
that led Schank and Abelson to develop their theory of scripts. See supra note
30 and accompanying text.
62

65

See id.

6 See, e.g., id. at 62-70; THAGARD, supra note 16, at 122-23; DAN"SON,
supra note 62, at 40-45.
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signals from other units. Once they are activated above a certain
level, they emit their own excitatory or inhibitory signals to other
nearby neurons in the network.67 Information is processed by the
patterns of firings within the system as a whole. This occurs by
means of a process of "spreading activation," whereby activity in
one or more neurons spreads across the system through links that
connect the neurons to one another. 68 The ability of one neuron
to excite or inhibit another depends upon the strength of the link
between them; in general, the strength of such links increases as
the same pattern of activation is repeated.69 Unlike linear
seriosymbolic processing, connectionist networks are linked in
parallel, which allows greater speed and flexibility in processing
* 70
inputs.

Connectionist processing can easily accomplish the sorts
71
of cognitive tasks that are difficult for seriosymbolic systems.
In particular, connectionist systems can account for how we
acquire cultural information, a learning skill that is so
problematic for seriosymbolic processing. In a connectionist
system, we internalize implicit cultural knowledge by observing
and participating in events of daily life. The inputs derived from
these experiences and from our own reactions to these
experiences, are processed in a distinctive pattern of network
activation. As these patterns of observation and action are
repeated, the weights of the connections between activated units
become increasingly stronger, until eventually the system
solidifies to the point that we almost instantaneously comprehend
a situation and how to respond to it.7 2- In this manner, the system
can be said to have "learned" meaning and response, without the
See, e.g., STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 62-70; DAWSON, supra note
62, at 40-45.
68 See THAGARD, supra note 16, at 62-63, 126.
69 See e.g., DAWSON, supra note 62, at 62-63; THAGARD, supra note 16, at
118-20; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 67-70.
70 See, e.g., THAGARD, supra note 16, at 107-14.
71 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 139-41, 144; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra
67

note 14, at 65-66, 73-73; Steven A. Sloman, Rational versus Arational Models
of Thought, in NATURE OF COGNrrION, supra note 44, at 557, 577.
72 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14 at 73-76; THAGARD, supra note 16,
at 118-19.
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need for unrealistic amounts of innate (preprogrammed)
background knowledge. 73
There is substantial debate among cognitive scientists as
to whether the fundamental (or at least predominant) mental
There is a
architecture is seriosymbolic or connectionist.
growing consensus, however, that human beings in fact employ
both. 74 In accordance with the pragmatic nature of human
cognition, the use of either a seriosymbolic or connectionist

system appears to depend to a significant extent upon the specific
type and context of reasoning situation. More abstract problems
are typically dealt with seriosymbolically, while more concrete
problems, particularly problems where a number of subsidiary
problems must be resolved in a holistic manner, are addressed by
connectionist networks. A commonly made distinction is that
seriosymbolic processing is more adept at (and therefore more
commonly used in) thought that requires "deliberate conscious
control" (solving a complex mathematics problem), while more
implicit, background thought generally reflects connectionism.75

The fact that we rely on more than one type of cognition
has several important implications for the relationship between
73 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 75-76.
74 See, e.g., D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 140-41; STRAUSS & QUINN, stupra
note 14, at 59; THAGARD, supranote 16, at 107-26; Sloman, supra note 71, at

578. Like seriosymbolic processing, there are certain types of reasoning that
connectionist systems are not very good at, particularly complex logical
relationships, and where seriosymbolic reasoning is likely to be employed.
See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 142-43; THAGARD, supra note 16, at 112.
Even among theorists who argue that cognition employs a rule-based cognitive
architecture, there is growing awareness that such a system, in order to
account for many facets of human mental activity, must be able to functionally
mimic certain aspects of a connectionist system, in particular parallel
processing of inputs, spreading activation, and associationist learning. This
means that even if seriosymbolic processing is ultimately determined to be the
basis of human cognitive activity, the points which we raise in this article in
connection with connectionist processing will likely still be valid. See, e.g.,
THAGARD, supra note 16, at 63 (rule-based systems for spreading activation);
DAWSON, supra note 62, at 194-96 (connectionist networks as "dynamic
symbols" within seriosymbolic processing architecture); STRAUSS & QUINN,
supra note 14, at 61 n.25 (reviewing various proposed connectionist flavored
seriosymbolic systems).
75 See STRAuSs & QUINN, supranote 14, at 57-58.
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cognition, culture, and more formalized cultural systems such as
law. First of all, there are no rules in connectionist systems,
only a set of weights and connections reflecting the repeated
application of the same schema to the same types of events
occurring in the physical or social world.76 Connectionist
reasoning is based upon making associations between past and
new experiences, often by means of metaphor and analogy."
Consequently, many of the regularities that can be found in social
cultural interactions make minimal use of formal rules and
maximal use of repeated encounters with specific instances.78
Secondly, rule-based (seriosymbolic) learning is typically faster
and easier to change than connectionist learning; rules can be
learned in a single lesson, while connectionist learning requires
time-consuming repeated exposure to similar stimuli. 79 On the
other hand, connectionist based learning of cultural models is
faster in application, and more resistant to change, provided that
the contexts of its use remain constant.80 Finally, even though
seriosymbolic reasoning that occurs on the conscious level can
override and change well established connectionist-based cultural
models, this is often difficult, either because these models are
pragmatically useful in a wide variety of contexts, or because
connectionist knowledge tends to be implicit. 81 We do not know
what we know in much of this domain of thought, and so are
unable to bring it under conscious control.

See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 145.
77 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 193-209; Naomi Quinn, The
Cultural Basis of Metaphor, in BEYOND METAPHOR: THE THEORY OF TROPES
IN ANTHROPOLOGY 56, 66-67 (James W. Fernandez, ed., 1991); Sloman,
supranote 71, at 577.
78 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 145.
79 See id. at 144.
so See id.
81See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 57.
76
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PART TWO
Until now, we have considered the question of human
cognitive styles in a general way. Now we focus on the key
How do consumers understand a commercial sales
issue:
transaction? Charles Fillmore has identified a cultural model
which he terms the "commercial event" model.82 Structurally,
this model consists of a small number of conceptual elements: a
purchaser, a seller, some type of merchandise, a price, perhaps
some bargaining, an offer, an acceptance and a transference of
the money as well as the ownership of the goods. 83 The mind
"chunks" together all of these concepts and forms a composite
structure that is apprehended holistically, on an immediate
intuitive level, even though the modular components are quite
complex in themselves. 84 Thus individuals can quickly decide
whether or not an observed event is an instance of the buying
model and proceed accordingly, unhampered by the need to
engage inan arduous and explicit logical analysis of every single
transaction that occurs in daily living. In short, we know how to
purchase a bag of apples without employing linear reasoning and
memorizing a set of rules. As human beings, we must be able to
instantly make use of our mental faculties for classification
purposes, and so we depend on our common sense connectionistbased understandings and hold a standard, yet flexible model in
our minds in order to participate in the many kinds of
transactions that are available in a highly diversified marketplace.
In contrast, if forced to turn to strictly seriosymbolic processing,
each cognitive task we face in purchasing the items needed in
everyday living would take an inordinate amount of time or could
not be accomplished at all.
The speed with which we go about our business under the
guidance of the commercial transaction model is quite remarkable
considering that bargaining is a highly sophisticated form of
Charles Fillmore, Topics in Lexical Semantics, in CURRENT ISSUES IN
LINGUISTc THEORY 102-05, 113-14 (ed. Roger W. Cole, 1977).
83 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 45; D'Andrade, supra note 40, at 112;
Quinn & Holland, supra note 16, at 33.
84
See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 44-45.
82
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communication.
The bargaining ritual implicates an
understanding of the concepts of a potential buyer and seller, an
initial asking price and a set of bids and counterbids which
possibly culminate in a final agreement. 8 5 Similarly, grasping
what is meant by the term ownership requires ascertaining the
sort of rights someone holds over something which, in turn,
entails knowledge of the abstract political idea of a right and of a
social agreement entitling someone to take actions in regard to
certain objects without interference from others. 86 What makes
these complicated discriminations possible is having been raised
in a particular society in which we are acculturated to think in
terms of certain specific kinds of models. Early childhood
learning, inculcated by family members and educational
institutions, etc., tends to influence us as adults because it is
reinforced throughout our lives and rests on the strong neural-like
connections that have experientially evolved in our minds. 7
Specifically, the formation of the commercial event model
is brought about through frequent exposure to basic, relatively
simple commercial activities: paying doctors and plumbers for
their services and purchasing food and other groceries, etc. 88
These ordinary cognitive tasks are ubiquitous in everyday life.8 9
Note also that one characteristic of all of these instantiations of
the commercial event model is that they involve few if any
unusual terms, and frequently occur in direct, face-to-face
encounters. 90 Through the media of television, the radio, films,
books and magazines, along with the advertisements contained in
these cultural transmissions, we are inundated with instantiations
See D'Andrade, supra note 40, at 142; KERTZER, supra note 22, at 80;
STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 72-76.
86 See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 45.
87 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 90, 93-96.
88 See Quinn & Holland, supra note 16, at 21; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note
14, at 125.
89 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 125.
90 It is worth noting in this context that Fillmore, in developing the
commercial transaction schema, made the point that the prototypical
commercial schema, as reflected in language usage of American speakers,
likewise was a very simple, face-to-face encounter. See Fillmore, supra note
85

82, at 113.
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of this prototypical buying model. Since we all constantly
engage in or observe such exchanges, the folk model of a
commercial transaction has come to be commonly shared, 9 t an
92
important facet of our culturally constituted folk knowledge.
Many in the population experience the same patterns
of
93
ways.
similar
in
them
interpret
and
interaction
commercial
Like other cultural models, the commercial event model
provides a stock mental scenario of the actors and the sequence
of events encompassed by a sales transaction. The cultural model
of a commercial transaction thus reflects the prototypical type of
sale that we frequently encounter in everyday life, with the open
slots filled in by default values based upon frequently enacted,
highly similar experiences.
In keeping with principles of
cognitive efficiency and schematic reasoning, this model
simplifies the world by invoking just enough schematized
information for a person to successfully survive and negotiate in
a specific social milieu; it does not include elements that are not
normally experienced in commonly repeated, prototypical
bargaining situations. 94 Whenever a buying event is encountered,

individuals draw upon their accumulated knowledge to make
sense of the event; such an event triggers all schematic units that
react to each new event's features; in turn, these units elicit
associations with other units, causing them to be activated as
well. 95 If there are changes in circumstances, connectionist
91See D'ANDRADE, supranote 14, at 179.
92 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 123-34 (explaining the
"centrifugal" forces that work against shared understandings, as opposed to

"centripetal" forces that facilitate the growth of common social meaning
structures). Note, however, that specific experiences, details and settings
vary, social stratifications are omnipresent and individuals differ in terms of
race, gender, ethnicity and status-based classifications.
93 See id. at 123-24.
94 See D'ANDRADE, supranote 14, at 150-51; D'ANDRADE, supra note 40, at
112, QUINN & HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 32-32; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra

note 14, at 33.
95 See STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at 53. It is important to point out
that the precise way in which cognitive forces operate in terms of enabling
human beings to form analogies and classification systems is not yet known.
For an overview of several theories on this topic, see DiMaggio, supra note
15, at 281.
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processing of the new information incorporates the new
information into the model in terms of its degree of
"representativeness," its similarity to our stock of past
experiences. 96
Thus, every new commercial situation is
immediately understood by having learned, beforehand, an entire
network of associations between the features of the specific
transactions that occurred in the past. New information is
assimilated into this pattern. 97 Consequently, although the model
allows us to perform in numerous commercial settings, our
perceptual field is largely circumscribed by the schemas that we
have already acquired. 98
Since schemata become more
accessible, that is to say, more available for use, if they have
been frequently activated by repetitive experiences, new
information - in particular, unusual, non-prototypical bargaining
events - might well be overlooked if the relevant schemas have
not been sufficiently reinforced. 99 Thus, we often tend to ignore
information that is in conflict with pre-established knowledge
constructs and to hold onto that which confirms our previous
expectations. 10o
Inevitably, some of the features of novel buying events
are not taken in because there is no schematic framework in
which to store them or there are only weak connections between
individual schematic units that are not often stimulated. 101 While
novel information can be taken into account using rule based,
seriosymbolic reasoning, this option .will often not be available
because the association between the cultural model and most
everyday types of sales transactions is too salient and
pragmatically useful to be overridden. The model is so implicit
in our everyday thinking that it simply remains unquestioned.
96 See KERTZER, supra note 22, at 81; STRAUSS & QUINN, supra note 14, at

52.
97 See STRAUSS &"QUINN, supra note 14, at 60.
98 See KERTZER, supra note 22, at 80.
99 See id.
10o
See id. See also DiMaggio, supra note 15, at 269-70; STRAUSS & QUINN,

supra note 14, at 90-91.
101See D'ANDRADE, supra note 14, at 207.

Kertzer explains that a schema's

availability is based on how frequently it has been used in the past and its
salience in memory. See KERTZER, supra note 22, at 80.
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The strength of this implicit cultural model is enhanced by
the fact that the prototypical sale event model might well be
closely linked to our capacity for embodied and imagistic
reasoning. The commercial event model is an outgrowth of one
of the fundamental, bodily-based root metaphors. Structurally, it
is a metaphorical projection of the primary source-path-goal
schema. 102 Because the model is deeply rooted in physical
experience, its most exemplary form can be understood as
similarly involving very simple, physical encounters with sellers
such as, for example, the purchase of groceries at the
This can clearly be seen through simple
supermarket.
introspection. Imagine what the term "sale" spontaneously tends
to evoke in your mind. Unless you are a formally trained
economist, the word "sale" likely brings to mind an associated
image of buying groceries or gasoline, along with, quite possibly,
a picture of a face-to-face bargaining situation with a seller (for
example, at a flea market). To be sure, the model can be
extended and the imagery altered so as to include more abstract
notions, such as impersonal electronic stock market transactions.
But normally this requires a certain amount of conscious effort,
of changing cognitive gears, possibly triggered by specific
contextual cues (like reading an article about the price of shares
in the Wall Street Journal).
The social framing of the commercial event also affects
the style of reasoning that the parties engage in when it comes to
the marketing of consumer products by large producers. As
noted before, reasoning processes are highly influenced by the
way in which a problem-solving situation is framed. Large
commercial enterprises typically attempt to act as rational profit
maximizers. In keeping with this goal, processes of planning,
production, and marketing are organized along formal,
deliberative lines; indeed, such firms typically employ a wide
variety of specialists to apply deliberative expertise to the various
facets of running the business. As a result, from the seller's
perspective, commercial exchanges involve consciously
calculated decisions concerning issues such as price, quantity,
Sophisticated sellers are therefore
and contractual terms.
102 See LAKoFF, supra note

22, at 285-86.
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inclined to engage in calculated thinking and to draw on serial
symbolic logic in considering what sort of terms should be
included in their contracts with buyers. For example, mindful of
the possibility of litigation, sellers are likely to draft standard
form contracts with an eye towards limiting liability as much as
possible. Such deliberative seriosymbolic thinking is made
possible by the fact that the seller is engaged in only a limited
number of types of sales transactions, and has the resources to
03
employ considerable bodies of expert knowledge.'
In contrast, consumers must handle a multiple number of
different kinds of sales events encountered in daily living, and
are limited to the use of their own cognitive faculties.
Consequently, they typically make use of connectionist reasoning
and build up a prototypical cultural model of sales transactions.
The tendency to rely on these models is strengthened by the fact
that they are employed on a recurring daily basis and are
pragmatically useful in these contexts. Recall, however, that
there is a price to pay for such cognitive efficiency. Because the
kind of information that is processed must be able to fit within
pre-def'med abstract knowledge categories, there is a tendency to
omit information that is inconsistent with what is already known
and to reinforce familiar expectations. 0 4 Consequently, buyers,
who employ a relatively simple cognitive model of sales
transactions, are not on an equal footing with sellers and might
well overlook unusual terms in their, agreements until a dispute
arises that causes them to focus on these terms at some later point
in time.
We refer to this situation, where parties to a social
interaction employ two fundamentally different reasoning styles,
as cognitive disparity. While some degree of cognitive disparity

is probably the inevitable result of the architecture of human
cognition and the way in which cognitive processes are
distributed in Society, it should be obvious that this phenomenon
This divergence of cognitive styles thus reflects the well-known fact that
cognitive resources, like other resources, are unevenly socially distributed
within a society. On the social distribution of cognition, see D'ANDRADE,
supra note 14, at 208.
103

104 See KERTZER. supra note 22, at 79.
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is deeply problematic in the context of contractual transactions
governing mass consumer sales. As lawyers we are well aware
that even where parties share an understanding of the basics of a
commercial transaction and where the terms of commercial
agreements are carefully and deliberately crafted, disagreements
over terms and performance obligations still may arise and
parties do not always treat each other in conformance with the
community's established norms of fairness.' 05 Some market
actors engage in questionable commercial practices and take
unfair advantage of the existing socioeconomic disparities in
bargaining power that are implicit in a highly stratified social
system in which we are variously situated.
A different but related problem exists where the parties do
not in fact understand the commercial event in the same way, and
are operating using different cognitive systems.
Because
consumers are typically the parties who are unable to fully
process all aspects of an unfamiliar transaction, more
knowledgeable sellers are in the position to exploit another type
of disparity: a cognitive disparity in bargaining power.
Moreover, it may be difficult (or even impossible) for consumers
to overcome this disparity by shifting their thinking in specific
contractual situations to the seriosymbolic mode, and away from
the connectionist reasoning used in most everyday transactions,
especially if they are not given adequate notice of the need to do
so. For this reason, exploitation of cognitive disparity appears to
be fundamentally unfair on a deep, cognitive level. We explore
this issue in Part Three of this article in the context of Hill v.
Gateway, and offer several suggestions on how to achieve a
relative equivalence in bargaining power. In particular, we argue
that in these situations there is a need for legal intervention and
that the law should acknowledge our widespread intuition that
allowing a seller to take advantage of a cognitive disparity is
inherently unfair.
1 refer to a descriptive meaning of fairness, based on household surveys of
public opinion. See, e.g., Daniel Kalmeman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H.
Thaler, Fairnessas a Constraintin Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,
76 Am. Econ. Rev. 4 (1986), reprinted in RICHARD H. THALER, QuAsI
105

RATIONAL ECONOMICS

199, 200 (1994).
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PART THREE
The issue in Hill v. Gateway concerned the presence of an
arbitration clause in a standard form contract. An arbitration
clause is an obvious example of the kind of term that fails to
attract attention and is hardly a normative expectation in run-ofthe-mill standard form contracts.
Although arbitration has
become a fixture in some industries ,106 it is not a widespread
practice in ordinary sales transactions involving the purchase of
household goods. This strongly suggests that consumers seldom
encounter an arbitration clause in a sales agreement. On the rare
occasion in which arbitration might be included in a contract,
buyers, probably, would be taken off-guard. In the absence of
past dealings, no schema has been installed in the mind to
provide for this contingency and the unfamiliar term would not
even be seen. The limitations in our cognitive processing, then,
could very well be partly responsible for the buyers' dilemma in
Hill v. Gateway. In point of fact, because this particular sale
involves an expensive and technologically complex piece of
equipment, the buying event is relatively unique, one that is
outside the experience of a good many individuals. There is so
much in the way of new information to process, it would not be
surprising if some details are not absorbed.
Under these circumstances, what is really going on in this
case is an attempt to take advantage of the consumers' practical
common sense knowledge of how sales agreements are usually
constructed and to count on the likelihood that they will not be
aware of the term and will not object to its inclusion in the
contract. 0 7 The seller is manipulating the buyers' normative
expectations as to what sort of terms and norms are typically
included in their agreements, and is trading on the inability of
For an overview of the various types of contracts in which arbitration
clauses are frequently found, see Reuben, supra note 12, at 604-07; Sternlight,
106

supra note 12, at 19-39.
107 In any case, few customers, realistically speaking, will go to the trouble
of
shipping the goods back to the manufacturer in order to reject the arbitration
clause.
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individuals to take in all the features that are present in a novel
buying event. In so doing, the seller is unfairly profiting from
The court,
the cognitive inequality in bargaining power.
however, did not take into account the divergence in cognitive
styles, and wrongly assumed that both parties were using
rationalist seriosymbolic reasoning.
Moreover, in failing to acknowledge the use of
connectionist reasoning, the court implicitly - and completely
unjustifiably - normatively privileged the putatively more
"rational," seriosymbolic thought over the alternative system. In
the mind of the judge, there is just one mode of reasoning
(seriosymbolic processing) and just one model of human
behavior: parties should be mentally prepared and constantly on
guard to protect their interests in every bargaining situation. But
it should be clear by now that this is nonsense. It is simply not
possible given the way our minds really work. 10 8 Also, the
computer industry is a highly competitive market. If there is
widespread dissatisfaction, an entrepreneurial firm may seek to
enlarge its market share by making it known that there is no
mandatory arbitration clause accompanying the sale of its
products. Further, game theoretic models suggest companies will
be less interested in deviating from prevailing business norms if
they intend to develop long-term relationships with their
customers, which could lead to repeat sales.
'08 It is possible that if arbitration is adopted by a good many computer
manufacturers, the practice will appear normative and our cognitive processes
will adjust accordingly. But cognitive models are extremely durable structures
and undergo as few changes as possible. Consumer preferences reflected in
these models are just as likely to prevent an alteration in a long-established
norm and thereby influence commercial practices instead of commercial
practices affecting the minds of consumers. Besides, it is not as if consumers
are sheep and will accept any and all changes introduced by sellers.
Individuals are capable of resisting attempts to establish less in the way of
warranties and remedies, etc., if it looks like dealers are taking advantage of
them and engaging in predatory practices. We can anticipate that resistance
will increase as the cost of sharing information decreases through the use of
the internet. Even today, internet communications have facilitated the ability
of people to organize and to pressure companies to withdraw from offensive
practices. See Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Senseless in Seattle II,
N.Y. Tn Es, Dec. 8, 1999, at A23.
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Schematic, connectionist reasoning must be employed
together with seriosymbolic thought in order for human beings
successfully to navigate in a sophisticated and highly diversified
environment. Neither connectionist nor seriosymbolic thought
has a priori normative superiority; it is a matter of which is
appropriate and commonly used in a particular problem solving
context. 10 9 And that is the core of the problem in Hill v.
Gateway: both parties are in fact utilizing an appropriate form of
reasoning given their different situations. Yet even though the
reasoning styles are appropriate, for the court to enforce an
unusual term imposed on the buyer by the seller is intuitively
believed to be fundamentally unfair.
We have previously suggested that much of our intuitive
feeling of unfairness in contractual settings may have its origins
in the nature of human cognition. We now flesh out this claim.
Experiments have shown that on a deep cognitive level, there are
structural frames of reference for deciding on unfairness.110
What we often mean by unfairness is deviation from mental
"reference points," consisting of previously experienced buying
events that become the benchmarks by which future transactions
are judged."'1 Past encounters with various kinds of sales, which
have been integrated into the commercial transaction cultural
model, thus generate a set of criteria for defining certain
important meanings of unfairness.
As such, recurrent
marketplace interactions produce codes of conduct (or groups of
informal norms) for behavior that constitutes what is "natural" or
normal in a given context. These codes of conduct have
significant implications for contract law. They allow us to
replace vague and impressionistic ideas of unfairness with a more
concrete understanding and a more scientifically determinable
standard as to how it arises in the course of business dealings.
109See,

e.g., Sloman, supra note 71, at 576-79.
See Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. Rtv. 1471, 1496 (1998).
" See id. Needless to say, unfairness is recognized through serial symbolic
reasoning as well. Consider coercion, the classic gun to the head type of
event in which we swiftly engage in a cost/benefit analysis in order to make a
decision.
11o
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This account is deeply rooted in the fundamental nature of human

cognition.
From this perspective, unfairness can be seen as having
two basic forms. The first relates to cognitive disparity. As just
discussed, any material deviation of contractual terms from the
reference points contained in frequently used cultural sales
models unfairly takes advantage of the consumer's necessary and
appropriate use of a different cognitive style, and in a way that
makes it difficult, without notice, for the buyer to be aware of the
deviation and to cure the disparity by shifting to a "rational,"
seriosymbolic mode. Indeed, it may be impossible to effect such
a shift in thinking even if notice is given, if the implicit,
background information contained in the model is strong enough.
The other type of unfairness can be viewed as substantive. Even
where notice is given, a contractual term may be viewed as
unfair if it departs too far from the typical terms and informal
norms included in our common sense models of commercial
transactions. For example, if consumers are accustomed to a one
year or more warranty on parts and labor on major items, such as
cars and appliances, limiting the warranty on a refrigerator to a
shorter period of time substantially diverges from the relevant
reference transaction, incorporated into the model, and just does
not seem fair, even if the2 warranty comports with formal
commercial law regulations. "
In Hill v. Gateway, the inclusion of a mandatory
arbitration clause comprises a material deviation from the
prototypical terms that are usually included in a sale of goods
contract. To consumers, who were not provided with notice of
the term, the deviation constitutes the very essence of
unfairness. 11 3 Note that it is not as if mass marketing telephone
sales are such a novel way of doing business that normative
standards have yet to emerge and become a fixture in the
industry. Rather, these transactions are governed by a number of
For an explanation of standards of unfairness and the rational actor model
of behavior, see id. at 1496.
112

Indeed, since the particular kind of arbitration term imposed on the buyers
in Hill v. Gateway amounts to an attempt to do away with all forums to
redress grievances, the clause in this case borders on fraud.
113
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tacit background assumptions that are deeply embedded in our
minds, and when these norms are violated by sellers, it is
considered a form of deceit. In this situation, the law must take
into account these background assumptions. From a cognitive
perspective, then, the decision in Hill v. Gateway to uphold the
arbitration term is simply irresponsible. The court seriously
undervalued the unfairness of imposing arbitration on
unsuspecting parties who are unprepared to respond according to
the seriosymbolic rational actor model and carefully scrutinize all
the terms in their sales agreements. The court assumed that
consumers should engage in deliberations and carefully consider
the consequences of their bargains. Yet in ruling against the
need for notice, the judge dispensed with the very means by
which this logical and cautious style of thought could ensue.
To avoid unfairness in this context, sellers should, at a
minimum, be required to draw attention to unusual provisions,
such as arbitration terms in standard form contracts, by providing
consumers with notice, either orally or in writing, before the sale
actually takes place. If an agreement to arbitrate is sufficiently
important to the seller, there is no reason why the term should
not be made clear from the onset. Buyers should be alerted to
the fact that they are dealing with a contract that departs from the
customary sale of goods reference transaction and are thereby in
a better position to weigh the degree to which they value the
protection of a courtroom proceeding. While notice is not
necessarily a cure for unfairness, at a minimum, consumers need
to be signaled to change their habitual thought patterns and to
switch to the alternative mode of reasoning, seriosymbolic
processing.
Once this occurs, customers are given the
opportunity to consciously and carefully deliberate over the
purchase and subject the proposal to a cost/benefit analysis,
which could lead to a different
course of conduct and shopping
114
around to find a better deal.
In this paper, we address the narrow issue of notice because it is the
primary focus of the court in Hill v. Gateway. Notice of an arbitration term
could be helpful in achieving the goal of a relative equivalence in bargaining
power if it is conspicuous and given sufficient emphasis. The problem is,
however, that regardless of the clarity of notice, consumers might not switch
"4

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/6

30

Horsburgh and Cappel: Cognition and Common Sense

2000

COGNITIONAND COMMON SENSE

1121

Further, perhaps any sort of arbitration provision,
including a low-cost and meaningful arbitration hearing before an
impartial panel of arbitrators, would be considered by many
individuals as a threat to our cultural model of justice.
Arbitration could convey a different social meaning than what is
meant by the phrase of the "right to a day in court." However,
since the scope of this essay is confined to an analysis of Judge
5
Easterbrook's opinion, I do not address this broader question. "1
gears and engage in a more cautious and more deeply reflective form of
thought before purchasing the merchandise. Cognitive bias needs to be taken
into consideration. If there is a tendency to underestimate the possibility of
problems in the future and the need to enforce the term, the signaling device
of notice might not have the desired effect and buyers will purchase the item
on the basis of a faulty risk assessment. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and The Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211,
216, 218, 223 (1995). Furthermore, standard form contracts, in particular,
require careful deliberation because they are often confusing and obscure. See
id. at 242. In addition, while an arbitration clause might well be innocuous in
agreements between savvy business people who hire lawyers to draw up the
terms and employ serial symbolic logic throughout the negotiation process,
consumers are hardly in the same position and do not control any of the
provisions in the contract. These defects in the bargaining scenario are serious
enough to warrant an outright prohibition of arbitration clauses in contracts
with consumers.
Moreover, we believe there are especially important reasons for not
permitting arbitration in the case at hand. As previously stated, the abstract
political concept of individual rights is one of the schemas that is associated
with the folk model of a commercial transaction. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. The interconnection between this schema and the
exchange model strongly suggests this model conceptually relates to our
cultural understanding of justice, including, in many cases, the belief in the
right to a day in court whenever there is unfair treatment by one's trading
partner. In Hill v. Gateway, customers are deprived of access to not only a
judicial proceeding, but also to an arbitration hearing. See supra note 4.
Accordingly, such an onerous clause in a sales transaction might well touch on
one of our fundamental political values, integral to our very way of life.
Under these circumstances, there is no question as to whether or not the term
should be upheld.
115 For other arguments as to why arbitration clauses should be banned in
various kinds of contractual situations, see Mark A. French, Hill v. Gateway,
2000, Inc., 12 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 811, 819 (1997) (claiming that a
mandatory arbitration provision in a contract with a consumer violates the
Magnuson-Moss Act); Reuben, supra note 12, at 609 (arguing alternate
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Finally, while the judge justified protecting the interests
of sellers on grounds of economic efficiency 1 16 (although even
here his logic is problematic), 117 he failed to realize that there is
an interrelationship between cognitive efficiency and economic

efficiency.

Empirical studies suggest that people care about

fairness and tend to act on this conviction. 11° Costly litigation
arises precisely because a contract is perceived as unfair
according to the background model, 19 which is a means for
ensuring a rapid and efficient transfer of numerous products and
for determining the very norms which produce a smoothly
functioning economy. To ignore what many in our society
believe is unfair is counterproductive. The very stability we
count on in our dealings with others is undermined when
manufacturers are not required to provide, at the very least, some
sort of signaling device informing consumers in advance that the
usual conventions associated with a specific type of transaction
do not apply. This is all the more true where our feelings of
unfairness are deeply held and affectively powerful, because they
are rooted in our fundamental cognitive structure. If marketplace
exchanges are too often seen as unfair, buyers become insecure
and hesitate to enter into sales transactions because the terms and
dispute resolution hearings constitute state action for constitutional purposes);
Sternlight, supra note 12, at 70, 82 (contending arbitration often violates the
right to a jury trial and the right to procedural due process).
116 See Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149.
117 Aside from his result-driven and highly manipulative contractual analysis,
Judge Easterbrook ignores the buyers' investment in time and expense if
forced to ship the goods back to the manufacturer, in order to reject the
arbitration term. And, surely, considerations of efficiency dictate that the
information costs be borne by the seller, the lowest cost avoider. See, e.g.,
M. J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 78, 84 (Anthony J. Kronman & Richard A.

Posner, eds., 1979). No rational consumer would be willing to incur the high
social costs involved in acquiring information about expensive and complicated
merchandise. See id. at 84.
118 This finding is discussed in Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 110, at
1479.
119 Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler point out that legal actions often ensue when
consumers believe they are not being treated fairly by firms in the market,
regardless of whether or not pursuing an action is in their own financial
interest. See id.
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norms associated with previous commercial arrangements cannot
be relied upon to anticipate how to respond to future buying
events. Perceptions of unfairness also deplete the stock of social
capital 120 fueling the economy and thereby work against the goal
of wealth maximization, which, Judge Easterbrook insisted,
should be the court's primary concern.
In summary, given that findings in cognitive science tell
us consumers are not always operating according to the
seriosymbolic rational actor model, it is important for the law to
be sensitive to the possibility of a cognitive disparity in
bargaining power, to be suspicious of standard form contracts
including unusual terms and to be more in line with the reasoning
processes and standards on unfairness governing actual human
behavior in the market. Departures from the prototypical terms
or prevailing informal norms in contracts with consumers should
either be unenforceable or, at a minimum, clearly highlighted, to
inform buyers to alter their customary habits of thought.
CONCLUSION
The scope of our essay is limited to a discussion of two
specific forms of unfairness: the exploitation of cognitive
disparities in bargaining power and deviations from the
commercial transaction cultural model in which past marketplace
experiences provide a structural framework for evaluating
unfairness. Of course, concentrating on only certain types of
unfairness does not rule out other varieties, including unfair
discriminatory commercial practices that harm certain social
groups. Further, we do not propose that cultural models should
always be respected, because some common sense folk models
are faulty and rooted in negative stereotypical assumptions about
A successful economy needs social capital as well as financial capital, and
includes such assets as trust and cooperation. These "norms of reciprocity"
are built through individuals working together in various civic organizations
that encourage an interest in the common good and facilitate a sense of
community.
See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital
Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2066 (1996) (citing ROBERT
120

PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:
W
CIvic TRADrIONS IN MODERN ITALY

182 (1993)).
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minorities. 121
Moreover, our proposal that common sense
standards on unfairness should be formalized in law is neither an
attempt to reach some supposedly objective transcendental justice
standard, outside the situatedness of human beings, nor is it an
effort to reduce the concept to nothing more than a mirror of the
status quo, leaving no room for change or expansion. Rather,
the idea is to define unfairness in human terms, grounding it in
the reality of human behavior as an embodiment of the way we
actually reason and function in this world.
We conclude this essay with one final thought.
Throughout our lives, we are social beings who depend on each
other in countless ways. Even the simplest act of engagement
with another human being implicates a degree of trust in that
person's intentions and conduct.
Respecting widely shared
understandings of unfairness that are deeply felt, on an intuitive
level, serves to preserve and encourage this sense of trust,
without which commerce falters and individuals lack the
confidence to bind together to form a workable society.

An indepth analysis of one such model can be found in Beverly Horsburgh,
The Voice of Silence: Cognition, Culture and Racism, 34 U. SAN FRANCISCO
L. Rnv. (2000) (forthcoming) (claiming a cultural model, based on folk
biology, regarding "natural kinds" of human beings, persists in our society
and is implicated in our inability to eradicate racism).
121
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